coder/coderd/httpmw/csrf.go

92 lines
3.2 KiB
Go

package httpmw
import (
"net/http"
"regexp"
"strings"
"github.com/justinas/nosurf"
"golang.org/x/xerrors"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/codersdk"
)
// CSRF is a middleware that verifies that a CSRF token is present in the request
// for non-GET requests.
// If enforce is false, then CSRF enforcement is disabled. We still want
// to include the CSRF middleware because it will set the CSRF cookie.
func CSRF(secureCookie bool) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
mw := nosurf.New(next)
mw.SetBaseCookie(http.Cookie{Path: "/", HttpOnly: true, SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode, Secure: secureCookie})
mw.SetFailureHandler(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Error(w, "Something is wrong with your CSRF token. Please refresh the page. If this error persists, try clearing your cookies.", http.StatusBadRequest)
}))
mw.ExemptRegexp(regexp.MustCompile("/api/v2/users/first"))
// Exempt all requests that do not require CSRF protection.
// All GET requests are exempt by default.
mw.ExemptPath("/api/v2/csp/reports")
// This should not be required?
mw.ExemptRegexp(regexp.MustCompile("/api/v2/users/first"))
// Agent authenticated routes
mw.ExemptRegexp(regexp.MustCompile("api/v2/workspaceagents/me/*"))
mw.ExemptRegexp(regexp.MustCompile("api/v2/workspaceagents/*"))
// Workspace Proxy routes
mw.ExemptRegexp(regexp.MustCompile("api/v2/workspaceproxies/me/*"))
// Derp routes
mw.ExemptRegexp(regexp.MustCompile("derp/*"))
// Scim
mw.ExemptRegexp(regexp.MustCompile("api/v2/scim/*"))
// Provisioner daemon routes
mw.ExemptRegexp(regexp.MustCompile("/organizations/[^/]+/provisionerdaemons/*"))
mw.ExemptFunc(func(r *http.Request) bool {
// Only enforce CSRF on API routes.
if !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api") {
return true
}
// CSRF only affects requests that automatically attach credentials via a cookie.
// If no cookie is present, then there is no risk of CSRF.
//nolint:govet
sessCookie, err := r.Cookie(codersdk.SessionTokenCookie)
if xerrors.Is(err, http.ErrNoCookie) {
return true
}
if token := r.Header.Get(codersdk.SessionTokenHeader); token == sessCookie.Value {
// If the cookie and header match, we can assume this is the same as just using the
// custom header auth. Custom header auth can bypass CSRF, as CSRF attacks
// cannot add custom headers.
return true
}
if token := r.URL.Query().Get(codersdk.SessionTokenCookie); token == sessCookie.Value {
// If the auth is set in a url param and matches the cookie, it
// is the same as just using the url param.
return true
}
if r.Header.Get(codersdk.ProvisionerDaemonPSK) != "" {
// If present, the provisioner daemon also is providing an api key
// that will make them exempt from CSRF. But this is still useful
// for enumerating the external auths.
return true
}
// If the X-CSRF-TOKEN header is set, we can exempt the func if it's valid.
// This is the CSRF check.
sent := r.Header.Get("X-CSRF-TOKEN")
if sent != "" {
return nosurf.VerifyToken(nosurf.Token(r), sent)
}
return false
})
return mw
}
}